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Efficient Immunization Strategies for Computer Networks and Populations
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We present an effective immunization strategy for computer networks and populations with broad
and, in particular, scale-free degree distributions. The proposed strategy, acquaintance immuniza-
tion, calls for the immunization of random acquaintances of random nodes (individuals). The
strategy requires no knowledge of the node degrees or any other global knowledge, as do targeted
immunization strategies. We study analytically the critical threshold for complete immunization.
We also study the strategy with respect to the SIR (susceptible-infected-removed) epidemiologi-
cal model. We show that the immunization threshold is dramatically reduced with the suggested
strategy, for all studied cases.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Cw, 02.10.Ox, 89.20.Hh, 64.60.Ak
It is well established that random immunization re-
quires immunizing a very large fraction of a computer
network, or population, in order to arrest epidemics that
spread upon contact between infected nodes (or individ-
uals) [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. Many diseases require 80%-100%
immunization (for example, Measles requires 95% of the
population to be immunized [1]). The same is correct for
the Internet, where stopping computer viruses requires
almost 100% immunization [5, 6, 7]. On the other hand,
targeted immunization of the most highly connected indi-
viduals [1, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11], while effective, requires global
information about the network in question, rendering it
impractical in many cases. Here, we develop a mathe-
matical model and propose an effective strategy, based
on the immunization of a small fraction of random ac-
quaintances of randomly selected nodes. In this way, the
most highly connected nodes are immunized, and the pro-
cess prevents epidemics with a small finite immunization
threshold and without requiring specific knowledge of the
network.
Social networks are known to possess a broad distribu-
tion of the number of links (contacts), k, emanating from
a node (an individual) [12, 13, 14]. Examples are the web
of sexual contacts [15], movie-actor networks, science ci-
tations and cooperation networks [16, 17] etc. Computer
networks, both physical (such as the Internet [18]) and
logical (such as the WWW [19], and e-mail [20] and trust
networks [21]) are also known to posses wide, scale-free,
distributions. Studies of percolation on broad-scale net-
works show that a large fraction fc of the nodes need to
be removed (immunized) before the integrity of the net-
work is compromised. This is particularly true for scale-
free networks, P (k) = ck−λ (k ≥ m), where 2 < λ < 3 —
the case of most known networks [12, 13, 14] — where the
percolation threshold fc → 1, and the network remains
connected (contagious) even after removal of most of its
nodes [6]. In other words, with a random immunization
strategy almost all of the nodes need to be immunized
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before an epidemic is arrested (see Fig. 1).
When the most highly connected nodes are targeted
first, removal of just a small fraction of the nodes re-
sults in the network’s disintegration [5, 10, 11]. This
has led to the suggestion of targeted immunization of
the HUBs (the most highly connected nodes in the net-
work) [8, 22]. However, this approach requires a com-
plete, or at least fairly good knowledge of the degree of
each node in the network. Such global information often
proves hard to gather, and may not even be well-defined
(as in social networks, where the number of social rela-
tions depends on subjective judging). The acquaintance
immunization strategy proposed herein works at low im-
munization rates, f , and obviates the need for global in-
formation.
In our approach, we choose a random fraction p of
the N nodes and look for a random acquaintance with
whom they are in contact (thus, the strategy is purely
local, requiring minimal information about randomly se-
lected nodes and their immediate environs ). The ac-
quaintances, rather than the originally chosen nodes, are
the ones immunized. The fraction p may be larger than
1 [23], for a node might be queried more than once, on av-
erage, while the fraction of nodes immunized f is always
less than or equal to 1.
Suppose we apply the acquaintance strategy on a ran-
dom fraction p of the network. The critical fractions,
pc and fc, needed to stop the epidemic can be analyt-
ically calculated. In each event, the probability that
a node with k contacts is selected for immunization is
kP (k)/(N〈k〉) [6, 10], where 〈k〉 =
∑
k kP (k) denotes
the average degree of nodes in the network. This quanti-
fies the known fact that randomly selected acquaintances
possess more links than randomly selected nodes [24, 25].
Suppose we follow some branch, starting from a random
link of the spanning cluster. In some layer, l, we have
nl(k) nodes of degree k. In the next layer (l+ 1) each of
those nodes has k − 1 new neighbors (excluding the one
through which we arrived). Let us denote the event that
a node of degree k is susceptible to the disease (not immu-
nized) by sk. To find out the number of nodes, nl+1(k
′),
of degree k′ that are susceptible, we multiply the number
2of links going out of the lth layer by the probability of
reaching a node of degree k′ by following a link from a
susceptible node, p(k′|k, sk). Then, we multiply by the
probability that this node is also susceptible given both
the node and the neighbor’s degrees, and the fact that
the neighbor is also susceptible, p(sk′ |k
′, k, sk). Since be-
low and at the critical percolation threshold loops are
irrelevant [6], one can ignore them. Therefore,
nl+1(k
′) =
∑
k
nl(k)(k−1)p(k
′|k, sk)p(sk′ |k
′, k, sk) . (1)
By using Bayes’ rule:
p(k′|k, sk) =
p(sk|k, k
′)p(k′|k)
p(sk|k)
. (2)
Assuming that the network is uncorrelated (no degree-
degree correlations), the probability of reaching a node
with degree k′ via a link, φ(k′) ≡ p(k′|k) = k′P (k′)/〈k〉,
is independent of k.
A random site (of degree k) is selected in each step with
probability 1/N . The probability of being redirected to
a specific acquaintance is 1/k. Thus, the probability
that the acquaintance is not selected in one particular
attempt, is (1 − 1/Nk), and in all Np vaccination at-
tempts, it is
νp(k) ≡
(
1−
1
Nk
)Np
≈ e−p/k . (3)
If the neighbor’s degree is not known, the probability is
νp ≡ 〈νp(k)〉, where the average (and all averages hence-
forth) is taken with respect to the probability distribu-
tion φ(k). The probability that a node with degree k′ is
susceptible is p(sk′ |k
′) = 〈exp(−p/k)〉k
′
, if no other infor-
mation exists on its neighbors. If the degree of one neigh-
bor is known to be k′: p(sk|k, k
′) = e−p/k
′
× 〈e−p/k〉k−1.
Since the fact that a neighbor with known degree is im-
munized does not provide any further information about
a node’s probability of immunization, it follows that
p(sk|k, k
′) = p(sk|k, k
′, sk′). Using the above equations
one obtains:
p(k′|k, sk) =
φ(k′)e−p/k
′
〈e−p/k〉
. (4)
Substituting these results in (1) yields:
nl+1(k
′) = νk
′
−2
p φ(k
′)e−p/k
′
∑
k
nl(k)(k − 1)e
−p/k . (5)
Since the sum in (5) does not depend on k′, it leads to
the stable distribution of degree in a layer l: nl(k) =
alν
k−2
p φ(k)e
−p/k, for some al. Substituting this into (5)
yields:
nl+1(k
′) = nl(k
′)
∑
k
φ(k)(k − 1)νk−2p e
−2p/k . (6)
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FIG. 1: Critical probability, fc, as a function of λ in scale-free
networks (with m = 1), for the random immunization (top
curve and open circles), acquaintance immunization (middle
curve and top full circles) and double acquaintance immu-
nization (bottom curve and bottom full circles) strategies.
Curves represent analytical results (an approximate one for
double-acquaintance), while data points represent simulation
data, for a population N = 106 [Due to the population’s fi-
nite size, fc < 1 for random immunization even when λ < 3].
Squares are for random (open) and acquaintance immuniza-
tion (full) of assortatively mixed networks (where links be-
tween sites of degree k1 and k2(> k1) are rejected with prob-
ability 0.7
(
1− k1
k2
)
).
Therefore, if the sum is larger than 1 the branching pro-
cess will continue forever (the percolating phase), while if
it is smaller than 1 immunization is sub-critical and the
epidemic is arrested. Thus, we obtain a relation for pc:
∑
k
P (k)k(k − 1)
〈k〉
νk−2pc e
−2pc/k = 1 . (7)
The fraction of immunized nodes is easily obtained
from the fraction of nodes which are not susceptible,
fc = 1−
∑
k
P (k)p(sk|k) = 1−
∑
k
P (k)νkpc , (8)
where P (k) is the regular distribution, and pc is found
numerically using Eq. (7).
A related immunization strategy calls for the immu-
nization of acquaintances referred to by at least n nodes.
(Above, we specialized to n = 1.) The threshold is lower
the larger n is, and may justify, under certain circum-
stances, this somewhat more involved protocol.
The acquaintance immunization strategy is effective
for any broad-scale distributed network. Here we give
examples for scale-free and bimodal distributions, which
are common in many natural networks. We also give
an example of an assortatively mixed network (where
high degree nodes tend to connect to other high degree
nodes [26]). We also discuss the effectiveness of the strat-
egy in conjunction with the SIR epidemiological model.
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FIG. 2: Critical concentration, fc, for the bimodal distri-
bution (of two Gaussians) as a function of d, the distance
between the modes. The first Gaussian is centered at k = 3
and the second one at k = d + 3 with height 5% of the first.
Both have variance 2 (solid lines) or 8 (dashed lines). Top 2
lines are for random immunization. The bottom 2 lines are
for acquaintance immunization. All curves are analytically
derived from Eqs. (8) and (7). Very similar results have been
obtained for bimodal distributions of two Poissonians. Note
that also for the case d = 0, i.e. a single Gaussian, the value
of fc reduces considerably due to the acquaintance immuniza-
tion strategy. Thus the strategy gives improved performance
even for relatively narrow distributions [27].
In Fig. 1, we show the immunization threshold fc
needed to stop an epidemic in networks with 2 < λ < 3.5
(this covers all known cases). Plotted are curves for the
(inefficient) random strategy, and the strategy advanced
here, for the cases of n = 1 and 2. Note that while
fc = 1 for networks with 2 < λ < 3 (e.g. the Internet)
it decreases dramatically to values fc ≈ 0.25 with the
suggested strategy. The figure also shows the strategy’s
effectiveness in case of assortatively mixed networks [26],
i.e., in cases where p(k′|k) does depend on k, and high
degree nodes tend to connect to other high degree nodes,
which is the case for many real networks.
Fig. 2 gives similar results for a bimodal distribution
(consisting of two Gaussians, where high degree nodes
are rare compared to low degree ones). This distribu-
tion is also believed to exist for some social networks,
in particular, for some networks of sexual contacts. In
Fig. 3 geographical effects, where nodes tend to connect
to geographically adjacent ones [35], are also taken into
account. The improvement gained by the use of the
acquaintance immunization strategy is evident in both
cases, as seen in Figs. 2 and 3.
The above considerations hold if full immunization is
required. That is, given a static network structure, one
wishes to stop any epidemic or virus propagation. How-
ever, most real viruses have a finite infection rate, and,
therefore, a finite probability of infecting a neighbor of
an infected node. The SIR model, widely studied by
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
f
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Pinf
FIG. 3: The fraction of the population infected in the endemic
state, Pinf , as a function of f , the immunized fraction of
the population, for a scale-free network embedded in a 2d
geographical space (see [35]). The solid lines are for random
(top) and acquaintance (bottom) immunization for a network
with λ = 2.8 and the dashed lines are for the same cases with
λ = 4. In all cases N = 106 andm = 4. In both cases (λ = 2.8
and 4) the acquaintance immunization strategy provides a
considerable improvement over random immunization. The
high values for fc stem from the fact that the network is
very well connected with m = 4, which was taken in order to
approach a regular square lattice at λ→∞
epidemiologists [28, 29, 30], assumes that nodes can be
susceptible, infected, or removed (i.e. recovered and im-
munized against further infection or otherwise removed
from the network). This epidemiological model can be
mapped to a bond percolation model, where the concen-
tration of bonds, q = 1− e−rτ , where r is the transmissi-
bility of the virus (infection rate over a link) and τ is the
infection time. To find the effect of the strategy, given
this finite infection probability, the right hand side of Eq.
(1) should be multiplied by q, giving:
∑
k
P (k)k(k − 1)
〈k〉
νk−2pc e
−2pc/k = q−1 . (9)
instead of Eq. (7). Results for different infection rates
and scale-free networks with λ = 2.5 and λ = 3.5 are
shown in Fig. 4. As can be seen in the figure, in the limit
τr → ∞ this model leads to the full immunization case
of Fig. 1. For lower values of r, the proposed strategy
still gives similar, or even larger, decrease in the immu-
nization threshold.
Various immunization strategies have been proposed,
mainly for the case of an already spread disease, and are
based on tracing the chain of infection towards the super-
spreaders of the disease [2]. This approach is different
from our proposed approach, since it is mainly aimed at
stopping an epidemic after the outbreak began. It is also
applicable for cases where no immunization exists and
only treatment for already infected individuals is possi-
ble. Our approach, on the other hand, can be used even
before the epidemic starts spreading, since it does not
require any knowledge of the chain of infection.
In practice, any population immunization strategy
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FIG. 4: Critical concentration, fc, vs r, the infection rate,
for the SIR model with τ = 1. The solid lines are for random
(top) and acquaintance immunization (bottom) for scale-free
networks with λ = 2.5. The dashed lines are for λ = 3.5 (top
– random, bottom – acquaintance immunization).The circles
represent simulation results for acquaintance immunization
for scale-free networks with λ = 2.5.
must take into account issues of attempted manipula-
tion. We would expect the suggested strategy to be less
sensitive to manipulations than targeted immunization
strategies. This is due to its dependence on acquain-
tance reports, rather than on self-estimates of number of
contacts. Since a node’s reported contacts pose a direct
threat to the node (and relations), we anticipate that
manipulations would be less frequent. Furthermore, we
would suggest adding some randomness to the process:
for example, reported acquaintances are not immunized,
with some small probability (smaller than the random
epidemic threshold), while randomly selected individuals
are immunized directly, with some low probability. This
will have a small impact on the efficiency, while enhanc-
ing privacy and rendering manipulations less practical.
In conclusion, we have proposed a novel efficient strat-
egy for immunization, requiring no knowledge of the
nodes’ degrees or any other global information. This
strategy is efficient for networks of any broad-degree dis-
tribution and allows for a low threshold of immuniza-
tion, even where random immunization requires the en-
tire population to be immunized. We have presented an-
alytical results for the critical immunization fraction in
both a static model and the kinetic SIR model.
As a final remark, we note that our approach may be
relevant to other networks, such as ecological networks of
predator-prey [31, 32], metabolic networks [33], networks
of cellular proteins [34], and terrorist networks. For ter-
rorist networks, our findings suggest that an efficient way
to disintegrate the network, is to focus more on removing
individuals whose name is obtained from another mem-
ber of the network.
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